What Does the Lisbon Treaty Change Regarding Subsidiarity within the EU Institutional Framework? by Arribas, Gracia Vara & Bourdin, Delphine
13
The principle of subsidiarity refers in general to the choice of the most 
suitable and efficient level for taking policy action. The European Union 
associates subsidiarity with the way of taking decisions ‘as closely 
as possible to the citizen’, as it is referred to in the EU treaties. Thus, 
ensuring the respect of subsidiarity within the EU legislative framework 
ensures that any EU action is justified when proposing draft legislative 
acts. The Lisbon Treaty establishes new mechanisms reinforcing 
subsidiarity control, both ex ante and ex post the EU legislative process, 
and by doing so, enhances mainly the role of the national parliaments 
(and to a lesser extent the regional parliaments) and the Committee of 
the Regions. But in the end, this is a way of ensuring legitimacy of the 
EU action as it is quite often questioned, especially in times of crisis. 
Years of practice will tell whether the words will join reality.
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Introduction
The Lisbon Treaty reinforces provisions with regard to the 
subsidiarity principle and gives a new, important role to the 
national parliaments. This is especially highlighted by the new 
order of the protocols attached to the EU Treaties: Protocol   
No 1 on the role of national parliaments in the European Union 
(ex-Protocol No 9) and Protocol No 2 on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (ex-Protocol 
No 30). Through the provisions of these two protocols and 
of other articles in the body text of the European treaties, a 
new approach of subsidiarity can be noted as well as a more 
inclusive definition of the principle since Article 5 TUE now 
refers explicitly to the regional and local levels. Moreover the 
Lisbon Treaty clearly establishes new mechanisms to control 
subsidiarity both ex ante and ex post the EU legislative process; 
it raises the profile of some actors in the European institutional 
arena, such as the national 
parliaments with the Early 
Warning System, and the 
Committee of the Regions 
with its new right to bring 
a case before the Court 
of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU). These 
major novelties regarding 
subsidiarity, affect both the 
EU institutional framework 
and its procedural 
mechanisms, and may be 
considered as another 
step towards a European 
multilevel and multi-actor 
governance.
A new inclusive approach of the subsidiarity principle for 
the European Union
With the Lisbon Treaty, an explicit reference has been made for 
the first time to the regional and local levels in the provision 
concerning the subsidiarity principle, which renders this new 
approach of subsidiarity more inclusive than it was within 
the former treaties. Indeed, Article 5 TEU states that ‘Under 
the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within 
its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and insofar 
as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States, either at 
central level or at regional and local level, 
but can rather, by reason of the scale or 
effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at Union level’. The recognition 
of the role of the regional and local 
authorities in the European integration 
process through the new definition of 
the subsidiarity principle could also 
be examined with regard to the taking 
into account of the local and regional 
dimensions in new policy fields, these 
being climate change (Article 191 and 
192 TFEU), energy (Article 194 TFEU) and 
civil protection (Article 196 TFEU). 
This new inclusive approach of the subsidiarity principle 
is being developed and implemented by the European 
institutions. The recent EP Resolution1 deserves special 
mention as it emphases that ‘it is essential for scrutiny of the 
principle of subsidiarity to extend to the regional and local levels 
in the Member States’. It calls on the national parliaments to 
consult the regional parliaments with legislative powers, and 
on the Commission to pay attention to the role of the latter.   
On the other hand the Subsidiarity Annual Report published 
by the Committee of the Regions and the REGPEX website2  
set up by the Committee assists the exchange of information 
and will make further improvements in the regional/local 
monitoring of subsidiarity.
Ex ante subsidiarity control: the early warning system
Under the Lisbon Treaty, the ex ante monitoring role of the   
national parliaments has been strengthened as regards control 
over the subsidiarity principle (but not the proportionality 
principle, which monitors 
that the draft legislative 
act does not go beyond 
what is necessary). Arti-
cle 12 b. TEU states that 
‘National parliaments shall 
contribute actively to the 
good functioning of the   
Union […] by seeing to it that 
the principle of subsidiarity 
is respected in accordance 
with the procedures provided 
for in the Protocol on the   
application of the principles 
of subsidiarity and propor-
tionality’.
Article 7 of Protocol No 2 
on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality describes the process of the so-called early 
warning system: ‘The European Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission, and, where appropriate, the group of Member 
States, the Court of Justice, the European Central Bank or the 
European Investment Bank, if the draft legislative act originates 
from them, shall take account of the reasoned opinions 
issued by national parliaments or by a Chamber of a national 
parliament. Each national parliament shall have two votes, 
shared out on the basis of the national parliamentary system. In 
the case of a bicameral Parliamentary system, each of the two 
Chambers shall have one vote.’ This is also underlined in Article 8 
of Protocol No 1 on the role of national 
parliaments in the European Union, 
‘Where the national parliamentary system 
is not unicameral, Articles 1 to 7 shall apply 
to the component Chambers.’
Still, according to Article 7 of Protocol 
No 2 on the application of the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality, a 
draft European legislative act must 
be reviewed within the eight-week 
time limit if one third – or one quarter 
in the area of freedom, security and 
justice – of the national parliaments 
oppose its subsidiarity arguments. 
The Commission, a group of Member 
States or the European institution from which the draft 
originates, may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the 
draft and reasons must be given for each decision. This is 
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the ‘yellow card’ procedure. In 2010, a total of 211 opinions 
were received from national parliaments but only a small   
number of them (34 overall) raised subsidiarity concerns. The 
first yellow card case came more than three years after the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and is related to the EC 
proposal for a Council regulation on the exercise of the right 
to take collective action within the context of the freedom 
of establishment and the freedom to provide services (the 
so-called ‘Monti II-regulation’) 
published on 21 March 20123. 
On 30 May 2012, the College of 
the Commissioners confirmed 
that the one-third threshold of 
national parliaments/chambers 
from 12 Member States4 
expressing concerns about 
subsidiarity infringement of the 
proposal had been reached. 
Facing the disagreement of 
national parliaments/chambers, 
trade unions and some national 
governments, the European 
Commission decided to withdraw 
its proposal on 11 September 
2012. Yet, the spokesman of László 
Andor European Commissioner 
for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, indicated that 
this decision was not based on the yellow card, for which it 
is not justified, but because the Commission knew it did not 
have enough political support from the European Parliament 
and the Council of Ministers (requiring unanimity for this 
EC proposal)5.  In any case, after some doubt concerning 
the efficiency of such a ‘heavy’ mechanism to be set for 
each national parliament/chamber, this is the proof that the 
early warning system is raising awareness within national 
parliaments of the importance of adequate scrutiny of 
legislative proposals, and is essential for national parliaments 
to act as a counterbalance in the EU legislative process.
Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty 
– contrary to the defunct Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for 
Europe (2003) – establishes another 
procedure called the ‘orange card’ 
which applies only to the draft 
European legislative acts falling under 
the ordinary legislative procedure   
(the former co-decision procedure). 
If more than half of the national 
parliaments oppose such an act on the 
grounds of subsidiarity arguments, 
the latter must be reviewed. The 
European Commission may then 
decide to maintain, amend or 
withdraw the proposal. If the European 
Commission decides to maintain 
its proposal, then it has to provide a reasoned opinion 
justifying why the Commission considers the proposal to   
be in compliance with the subsidiarity principle. On the 
basis of this reasoned opinion, and that of the national 
parliaments, the European legislator, by a majority of 55 
per cent of the members of the Council or a majority of the   
votes cast in the European Parliament, shall decide whether 
or not to block the EC proposal. 
The provisions related to subsidiarity check brought about 
by the Lisbon Treaty provide national parliaments with 
incentives to consider draft European legislative acts at an 
early stage of the EU law-making process. The thresholds for 
the ‘yellow and orange cards’ have underscored the need for 
greater inter-parliamentary cooperation, e.g. by exchanging 
respective parliaments’ contributions, in order to establish 
a common interpretation of subsidiarity in Europe. The IPEX 
website (Inter parliamentary 
EU Information Exchange)6 
constitutes the principal source 
of information on the state of 
play of the subsidiarity check 
in other national parliaments. 
Bilateral contacts and intensive 
exchange of information through 
their permanent representatives 
in Brussels is also a common 
practice among national 
parliaments.
According to Article 6 of Protocol 
No 2 on the application of 
the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality, ‘It will be 
for each national parliament 
or each Chamber of a national parliament to consult, where 
appropriate, regional parliaments with legislative powers’.   
Most of the regional parliaments automatically receive all 
legislative proposals from the central level, thus different 
filtering systems have been established by some national/
regional parliaments. Nevertheless, efficient involvement of 
the regional parliaments in subsidiarity checks can still be 
improved, partly  due to the ongoing revisions of the existing 
procedures to do so in most of the countries with regional 
parliaments7. Moreover, it should also be highlighted that 
the resources and time for conducting subsidiarity checks for 
some regional parliaments is scarce, thereby expressing the 
need to better evaluate the importance 
of the EU draft legislative proposals 
and be selective before embarking in a 
detailed subsidiarity scrutiny exercise. 
The European Parliament has recently 
called for an analysis of the time scales 
laid down in the treaties, to determine 
whether or not they are sufficient. 
Due to the former general lack of 
involvement of regional parliaments 
in  ex ante subsidiarity control, 
Article 6 of Protocol No 2 certainly 
aims to enhance their role and 
pushes them to be part of a new 
process defining the respective 
roles of the new key actors of the   
EU legislative process. The Lisbon 
Treaty creates awareness of the subsidiarity principle 
within the parliamentary systems of the EU, facilitating 
the establishment of a culture of European debate, which 
was rather absent until now in most regional assemblies.   
The early warning system (EWS) therefore raises awareness 
about the importance for national and regional parliaments to 
act as a counterbalance in the EU legislative process. If building 
upon the lessons learnt, the actors involved will open up   
a new path towards the efficient use of the opportunities 
provided by the EWS. Indeed, making use of the possibilities to 
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establish an early multilevel dialogue to formulate EU policy/
legislation with other parliaments (regional and national), 
as well as with the European Commission, goes beyond the 
previous existing practice of legislative/executive scrutiny 
within the internal borders. 
Ex post subsidiarity control: bringing a case to the CJEU for 
infringement
National parliaments also have the possibility to participate in 
an ex post subsidiarity control, as the Lisbon Treaty provides 
that an action might be brought to the CJEU by a Member 
State in the name of its parliament or one of its Chambers if it 
is a bicameral parliamentary system, and if the latter considers 
that a legislative act does not respect the subsidiarity principle. 
Article 8 of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality states that ‘The Court of 
Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction in actions 
on grounds of infringement of the principle of subsidiarity by a 
legislative act, brought in accordance with the rules laid down 
in Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union by Member States, or notified by them in accordance 
with their legal order on behalf of their national parliament or a 
Chamber thereof.’
Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty brings about one of the biggest 
novelties concerning the Committee of the Regions since its 
creation by the Maastricht 
Treaty: the right to bring a 
case before the Court of 
Justice of the European 
Union for the annulment 
of an EU legislative act, 
in two cases: to protect 
its own prerogatives 
(Article 263 TFEU) and 
to ensure respect of the 
subsidiarity principle 
regarding legislative acts 
for the adoption of which the EU treaties provide its 
consultation (Article 8 of the Protocol No 2 on the application 
of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality). These 
new provisions are proof that the complaints expressed in 
1995 by the CoR about how difficult it is to bring a case before 
the Court for any infringement of the subsidiarity principle 
by an EU institution, have finally been partially heard: ‘In the 
case of annulment proceedings, Community procedures confer 
on the Commission, Council and Member States the general 
right to bring actions, whereas the Parliament [this is no longer 
the case] and European Central Bank may only bring actions 
to protect their prerogatives. Other natural or legal persons 
[thereby including the CoR at that time] have to demonstrate 
that a legal act affects them directly and individually […]. The 
Committee of the Regions and its constituent members are in 
an extremely weak position in respect of this system. The nature 
of the subsidiarity principle coupled with the lack of direct effect 
make it impossible to appeal against an act or a failure to act 
of a Union institution in breach of the above principle, insofar 
as the plaintiff has to provide proof that he has been directly 
and individually affected. Consequently, the Committee and its 
constituent members find themselves in practice in a situation 
where they are unable to defend themselves – something which 
is contrary to the spirit of Community law’ 8. 
The former CoR President, Luc Van den Brande, declared a few 
months after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty: ‘We see 
this new right to challenge EU laws in court more as a deterrent 
than an actual threat. We are convinced that this new possibility 
will deepen our relations with other EU institutions and national 
parliaments. We will exercise this right with caution, but with 
great conviction in cases where we feel it is necessary to defend 
the subsidiarity principle in EU law-making. However, we hope 
that swift implementation of all Lisbon Treaty provisions, which 
reinforce subsidiarity already in the pre-legislative stage and 
during the adoption of new EU laws, will ensure that it never 
comes to that’9.  In May 2012, the Bureau of the CoR revised the 
COR strategy about subsidiarity monitoring. It specified that 
‘the CoR has already adopted rules for taking the appropriate 
judicial steps. Such actions may be proposed to the Plenary 
Assembly either by the President or by the competent commission 
acting in accordance with Rules 53. The Legal Service has 
prepared a Handbook which describes a ‘modus operandi’ that 
should be followed in the event of bringing an action before the 
Court of Justice on grounds of subsidiarity’. It also reiterated its 
position highlighting that ‘any potential action before the Court 
of Justice should be understood only as a last resort and the final 
step of a process’10.
The Lisbon Treaty’s provisions can be considered as an   
important step for the Committee of the Regions regard-
ing its place in the European institutional arena. Its new,   
important right to bring a case before the CJEU will reinforce   
its role at an early stage   
of the legislative process, 
firstly by ensuring that 
it is consulted by the   
European institutions 
when the EU treaties   
provide it, and secondly, 
by scrutinising EU leg-
islative proposals and 
their compliance with the   
subsidiarity principle.
Conclusion
The abovementioned Lisbon Treaty provisions strengthen 
the national parliaments’ role and may also constitute a 
substantial breakthrough for regional parliaments with 
legislative powers if they become truly conscious of the 
importance of adequate scrutiny of legislative proposals. 
These novelties are the result of the political will to stimulate 
participation of national parliaments in EU matters and to 
bring Europe closer to its citizens. 
Moreover, regional and local authorities across Europe will 
witness important progress as a result of the Lisbon Treaty, 
towards the recognition of multi-governance in the European 
Union. A more inclusive Europe seems to favoured: better 
involvement of regional and local expertise in the quest 
for a more cohesive Europe together with a reinforced 
principle of subsidiarity and an increasing role granted to the 
national parliaments. Many concrete novelties ensure that 
EU governance will evolve into more advanced multi-level 
forms; the most general ones are of utmost interest to local 
and regional authorities as they could change the way of 
working and cooperating with the other levels of government 
participating in the European decision-making process. 
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Yet, one should bear in mind that Protocols No 1 on the role 
of the national parliaments and No 2 on the subsidiarity and 
proportionality principles apply only to the EU legislative acts, 
but not to the EU non-legislative acts (i.e. the delegated and 
implementing acts). Therefore, the determination of an EU 
legislative act/non-legislative act has an important impact 
on the right of recourse to the control mechanisms facilitated 
by the Lisbon Treaty’s provisions regarding the national 
authorities and their regional and local entities. 
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